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Systematizing Semantic Knowledge: Changes 
over Time in the Child's Organization of 
Word Meaning 
Melissa Bowerman 
University of Kansas 
BOWERMAN, MELISSA. Systematizing Semantic Knowledge: Changes over Time in the Child's 
Organization of Word Meaning. CoLD DEVELOPMENT, 1978, 49, 977-987. Selected spontane- 
ous errors of word choice made between the ages of about 2 and 5 by 2 children whose lan- 
guage development has been followed longitudinally were analyzed for clues to semantic de- 
velopment. The errors involved the children's occasional replacement of a contextually required 
word by a semantically similar word after weeks or months of using both words appropriately. Because the errors were not present from the beginning and because correct usage prevailed 
most of the time, the errors cannot be explained by existing accounts of semantic development, 
which ascribe children's word-choice errors to initial linguistic immaturity. A plausible alter- 
native account likens the errors to adult "slips of the tongue" in which the speaker, in the 
process of constructing a sentence to express a given meaning, chooses incorrectly among com- 
peting semantically related words. Interpreted in this way, the errors indicate that the process 
of drawing words into structured semantic systems based on shared meaning components begins 
much earlier than experimental studies have suggested. They also provide evidence for certain differences between children and adults in the planning and monitoring of speech. 
A primary method for exploring young 
children's understanding of word meaning has 
been the analysis of their spontaneous errors 
of word choice. The significance of these errors 
has been debated in the recent literature, and 
several different hypotheses have been ad- 
vanced to account for them. In this paper I 
will present error data that cannot easily be 
accounted for by any of the existing models 
and argue that these data provide evidence for 
the early onset of a process that has been 
thought not to take place until relatively late in development, the growth of a sense of 
semantic relatedness among words. 
The errors to be discussed were collected 
from my two daughters, Christy and Eva, whose 
language development I have followed closely 
by daily notes and periodic taping from the 
time of first words (Bowerman 1974, 1976, 
1977, 1978, Note 1). The following error illus- 
trates the genre. 
Eva, 3-9, to Mother, who is fixing dinner: "Can I have any reading behind the dinner?" 
The situational context of this utterance and 
the subsequent conversation made it clear that 
Eva wanted to be read to after dinner. Why 
did she not say "after"? Let us consider some 
possible explanations. 
Existing Hypotheses 
According to Clark (1973), children's 
errors of word choice reflect incomplete knowl- 
edge of the meanings of the incorrectly used 
words. In her "semantic feature" hypothesis of 
the acquisition of word meaning, Clark pro- 
posed that children at first identify a word 
with only one or a very few semantic features 
from the full set of features that constitutes 
the meaning of the word for adults. Because 
these first features are very general (e.g., 
[+ four-legged] for doggie), the child over- 
extends the word-that is, uses it for a broader 
range of referents than an adult would. Apply- 
ing Clark's proposal to Eva's error with behind, 
we might hypothesize that Eva made the error 
because she had as yet acquired only a rather 
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general feature for behind, such as [+ beyond 
or following (object or event X)]; she had 
not yet added a more specific feature such as 
[+ spatial] which would prevent her from 
using the word in the context of temporal 
"beyondness." 
Several investigators have questioned the 
claim that children's overextensions are due to 
an incomplete knowledge of word meaning. 
Bloom (1973), for example, proposes that 
overextensions may stem from children's will- 
ingness to stretch available words whose mean- 
ings they really know to cover new referents 
for which they do not yet have names. Clark 
(1975) has revised her earlier hypothesis in 
light of more recent evidence and now also 
suggests that at least some overextensions may 
result from vocabulary limitations rather than 
underspecified word meanings. Following this 
account, we could hypothesize that Eva knew 
the meaning of behind but did not yet know 
the word after; her use of behind in an "after" 
situation was induced by a communicative 
need. 
A second account of children's early word- 
choice errors that does not assume incomplete 
knowledge of word meaning has been proposed 
by Huttenlocher (1974). According to this 
interpretation, overextensions may occur even 
when the child knows (i.e., can show compre- 
hension of) the meanings of both the over- 
extended word and the word required by the 
context. The error takes place, suggests Hutten- 
locher, because speech production initially 
places much heavier demands on the child 
than comprehension. Faced with the need to 
label a certain referent, the child is unable to 
retrieve the required word from his memory. 
Instead, he may retrieve the word in the same se- 
mantic domain (e.g., body parts, animals) that is most frequent in the speech he hears. Fol- 
lowing Huttenlocher's proposal, we might hy- 
pothesize that Eva knew the needed word, 
after, but was not yet able to retrieve it; 
behind was more accessible to her because 
(perhaps) she heard it more frequently. 
These various hypotheses differ in impor- 
tant ways, but they all make the basic assump- 
tion that errors of word choice stem from the 
child's initial linguistic immaturity. That is, 
they all predict that any errors a child is going 
to make in the use of a particular word should 
occur early and then drop out, either as the 
entry for the word in the child's mental lexicon 
is "filled in," as words are acquired for the 
referents to which the word was once extended 
in attacks of communicative need, or as a 
chronic difficulty in retrieving the needed word 
for production is eased. 
The pattern of word use in the period 
preceding Eva's error with behind is not con- 
sistent with this assumption. Both the over- 
extended word, behind, and the word called 
for, after, had been in Eva's active vocabulary 
for many months, and ui until the time of the 
error they had been used semantically and syn- 
tactically in a completely correct way, for 
spatial versus temporal concepts, respectively. 
This developmental pattern characterized a 
large number of word-choice errors made by 
Christy and Eva in the first few years of lan- 
guage acquisition. In every case, the incor- 
rectly used word had previously been used cor- 
rectly for a period of time ranging from a few 
weeks to a year or more, and at the time of 
the error the child had a more appropriate 
word in her vocabulary and usually used it 
where it was called for. Some errors were 
heard only once, like Eva's substitution of 
behind for after. Other errors were more fre- 
quent and systematic, recurring periodically for some time.1 
Substitution Errors as Evidence for the 
Recognition of Semantic Similarities 
among Words 
What accounts for these late-emerging 
errors? A plausible interpretation is suggested 
by analyses of adult "slips of the tongue," 
errors that have been extensively explored for 
the clues they provide to the speaker's organi- 
zation and storage of information about lan- 
guage structure and to the steps involved in 
generating utterances (e.g., Fromkin 1973). 
Adult slips of the tongue fall into several 
categories. The category that is relevant for 
present purposes is that of errors in which 
a 
"target" or intended word is accidentally 
IThe corpus of "late" errors under consideration in this paper represents only a subset of word-choice errors collected from these children. Many of their other errors can be interpreted according to hypotheses that invoke linguistic immaturity (e.g., see Bowerman 1976, 1978, Note 1). 
replaced by one that is semantically related 
to it. Examples taken from Fay and Cutler 
(1977), Fromkin (1971), and Nooteboom 
(1969) include the following: 
1. I really like to-hate to get up in the morning. 
2. It's at the bottom-I mean-top of the stack of books. 
3. The two contemporary, er-sorry, adjacent build- 
ings. 
4. Not Thackeray but someone that wrote below 
Thackeray-before Thackeray. 
It has been proposed that errors like these 
occur because of a minor breakdown in the pro- 
cess of sentence production (Fromkin 1971, 
1973, introduction; Laver 1973; Nooteboom 
1969). According to this model, the speaker 
starts with a certain meaning that he wants to 
communicate. He then must "construct . . . a 
neurolinguistic program for the expression of 
the idea 
.... 
This presumably involves the se- 
lection from long-term storage of lexical items 
and grammatical arrangements, together with 
their associated phonology, by criteria of se- 
mantic appropriateness to the expression of 
the initial idea" (Laver 1973, p. 134). At this 
stage, more candidate lexical items may be 
"activated" (Laver 1973, p. 135) than are 
ultimately selected. The speaker must there- 
fore be able to implicitly evaluate competing 
alternatives for their appropriateness for ex- 
pressing a given idea and choose among them. 
This is ordinarily accomplished without inci- 
dent. Sometimes, however, a word that is in- 
appropriate, although in the general semantic 
neighborhood of the desired word, is acciden- 
tally selected. The aspects of meaning shared 
by the target word and the word substituted 
for it are often formally represented in this 
model in terms of semantic features common 
to the speaker's lexical entry for both words. 
There are certain important similarities 
between adult semantically based slips of the 
tongue and the late-emerging errors collected 
from Christy and Eva. Most critically, in the 
case of both adult and child the errors involve 
words that are usually used correctly. In addi- 
tion, some of the children's errors were strik- 
ingly similar to those made by adults. Compare, 
for example, Eva's substitution of behind for 
after with the adult errors 3 and 4 above: all 
of these violate the distinction between posi- 
tion in space and position in time. These simi- 
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larities suggest that the children's errors, like 
those of adults, can be interpreted as resulting 
from an incorrect choice among semantically 
related words that compete for selection in a 
particular speech context. 
What is particularly interesting about the 
children's errors is that they did not begin 
to occur as soon as the child had both the 
word used wrongly and the word called for by 
the context in her active vocabulary; weeks or 
months of essentially correct usage intervened. 
This suggests that the child was not initially 
aware of the semantic similarities among the 
words with which she subsequently made 
errors. However, at some point during the 
period of correct usage for particular words 
a change or restructuring took place such that 
the semantic similarities became operative.2 
Following this shift, the child's intention to 
express a certain idea apparently called up 
more than one candidate lexical item from 
among which a choice had to be made. 
If this interpretation of children's late- 
emerging substitution errors is accurate, the 
errors reveal some interesting facets of early 
semantic development. First, they suggest that 
children begin to draw lexical items into struc- 
tured semantic systems based on shared mean- 
ing components much earlier than many in- 
vestigators have supposed. Second, the par- 
ticular errors they make indicate that young 
children are capable of perceiving surprisingly 
abstract and subtle semantic similarities among 
words. Third, certain differences between the 
children's errors and those made by adults 
have interesting implications for the develop- 
ment of the ability to plan a sentence to express 
a certain idea and monitor the adequacy of its 
execution. These topics are taken up in order. 
Building Semantic Networks: 
When Does It Begin? 
Psychologists have for some time been 
interested in the question of when the words 
in children's vocabularies become integrated 
into a coherent semantic system describable 
in terms of networks of shared semantic fea- 
tures (e.g., Anglin 1970; McNeill 1966; Miller 
1972). On the basis of experimental evidence 
of various kinds, they have typically concluded 
that this integration takes place-or begins to 
2 The exact nature of this change is unclear, but some possibilities will be considered in the 
concluding section of this paper. 
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take place-relatively late, at about the age of 
6-8 (e.g., Anglin 1970; Francis 1972; McNeill 
1966).3 
The substitution errors to be discussed 
in this paper indicate that, counter to this as- 
sumption, semantic integration can get under 
way well before the early school years-as early 
as 2-4 years of age. Differences in methods of 
data collection may account for this discrep- 
ancy in estimates of the age at which semantic 
integration begins. Past studies have employed 
tasks such as word association, free recall of 
lists of words, and sorting and rating of words. 
To perform on these tasks in a way that dem- 
onstrates a sense of semantic structure probably 
requires certain abilities-such as the ability 
to retrieve words consciously or to reflect about 
language-that may mature later than the on- 
set of semantic organization (Mansfield 1977). 
Mansfield, who tested children with a "false 
recognition" technique that she judged made 
fewer cognitive demands than more commonly 
used tasks, found that even kindergartners (the 
youngest children she tested) "have well-orga- 
nized conceptual systems based on shared 
meaning components" (1977, p. 75). Cramer 
(1974) obtained similar findings with a false 
recognition task. 
The method used in the present study, 
the collection and analysis of spontaneous 
speech errors, has the advantage of placing 
no demands on the child whatsoever. Thus, 
the data reflect semantic knowledge that may be completely unconscious and inaccessible 
"on demand." An additional advantage of the 
method is that the children demonstrate by 
their own errors what areas of the lexicon 
they have semantically integrated at a given 
time; they are not constrained to provide evi- 
dence on only those semantic domains the in- 
vestigator selects to study. The latter feature 
of the method is especially important because 
the errors produced by the subjects of this 
study are concentrated in semantic domains 
that have not been the subject of more con- 
trolled exploration. 
Some Error Data 
Errors with put, give, make, and let.- 
The most dramatic of the children's late- 
emerging substitution errors involved the inter- 
change of put and give, put and make, and 
make and let.4 These errors did not begin to 
occur until the children had been using these 
words in an essentially appropriate way for 
some time-for over a year, in Christy's case 
(there are some exceptions for put, to be de- 
scribed in the next section). Examples of these 
errors are presented in Appendix A, preceded 
by representative examples of the early seman- 
tically correct use of the words. Two examples 
of the put-make interchange collected from 
other children are also included to suggest that 
errors of these types may be rather general.5 
Why would put-give, put-make, and make- 
let come to compete with each other for se- 
lection in particular speech contexts? Semantic 
similarities between the words in these pairs 
have been discussed by several linguists. 
Both put and give, in their most basic and 
usual senses, specify actions in which an agent 
causes an object to move to a new location 
(Lyons 1967). Give has further ties to con- 
cepts of possession that put does not. However, 
it has often been hypothesized that possession 
is defined by young children not in terms of 
abstract concepts of ownership but on the basis 
of concrete cues of the physical location and 
control of objects. Thus, the essential distinc- 
tion between put and give for children-as 
Lyons (1967) has in fact argued is also true 
for adult English-may be simply that give is 
selected in the event of an animate goal (lo- 
cation to which something is conveyed), while 
put is selected when the goal is inanimate. 
Thus, one says "Give the book to Daddy," not 
*"'Put the book to Daddy," and "Put the book 
SThere is, however, evidence that words in some semantic domains may be seen as seman- 
tically related even before their meanings are fully understood (e.g., Bartlett [Note 2] on color terms; see also Clark 1973). 4 In these, as in several other semantic domains, the errors made b Christy and Eva were 
virtually identical. A "modelling" explanation for the errors of Eva. the younger child, must therefore be considered, but it can easily be ruled out on the basis of the children's age differ- 
ence, 2/2 years. By the time Eva began to make certain errors, Christy had typically long since 
stopped making them. Additionally, Eva's errors, like Christy's before her, were preceded by a period of correct usage. These facts support the inference that Eva's errors were a spontaneous byproduct of her own language processing rather than an effect of Christy's speech. 
51 am grateful to Ginny Gathercole and Mabel Rice for providing me with these and the 
"other children's" errors in Appendix B. 
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on the shelf," not *"Give the book on the 
shelf." 
Put and make also share elements of 
meaning. According to Binnick (1971), both 
verbs can be regarded as causative forms of 
be, with the selection between them in partic- 
ular speech contexts governed by whether the 
implicit be is followed by a locative or a stative 
phrase. Thus, for example, if one wants to ex- 
press how it came about that a chunk of Play- 
Doh "is on the table" (a location) one says 
(e.g.) "I put it on the table," not *"I made it 
on the table." Conversely, if one wants to ex- 
press how it happened that the Play-Doh "is 
flat" (a state) one says (e.g.) "I made it flat," 
not *"I put it flat." In many other types of 
sentences, locative and stative notions are ac- 
corded identical structural treatments (e.g., 
compare the use of the copula be in "It is on 
the table" and "It is flat"). This has led a 
number of linguists to hypothesize that locative 
and stative concepts are organized similarly in 
cognitive structure (e.g., Anderson 1969; Jack- 
endoff 1976; Talmy, Note 3). 
Finally, make and let are similar in mean- 
ing in that they are both facets of a superordi- 
nate concept of causation. The primary differ- 
ence between them is that make specifies active 
causation, in which an entity acts-does some- 
thing-with the result that some event comes 
about or is maintained, while let specifies pas- 
sive causation, in which an entity does not act, 
likewise with the result that some event comes 
about or is maintained. Compare, for example, 
the meanings of the following sentences: 
1. Mother made Johnny stay in bed. 
2. Mother let Johnny stay in bed. 
The similarity in meaning between make and 
let is attested to by the fact that in many lan- 
guages causative sentences are created with a 
causative morpheme that is indeterminate be- 
tween these two senses (e.g., see Comrie 1976). 
The fact that Christy and Eva used put, 
give, make, and let correctly before the onset 
of substitution errors, and continued to use 
them correctly most of the time even during 
the period of errors, indicates that when the 
errors started to occur they were not simply 
due to failure to discriminate between the vari- 
ous meanings. That is, the children clearly saw 
the difference between animate and inanimate 
goals, between changes of location and changes 
of state, and between active and passive cau- 
sation, and they knew which word was associ- 
ated with which meaning. Following the model 
outlined earlier, we can hypothesize that the 
onset of errors signaled a change or reorgani- 
zation of some type in the children's mental 
lexicon such that these word pairs, which were 
apparently not initially recognized as semanti- 
cally related, moved closer together in meaning. 
More on put and other cause-change-of- 
location verbs.-Well before Christy and Eva 
started to interchange put with give and make, 
they began to make periodic errors in which 
put, take, and bring were substituted for each 
other and for verbs such as drop and make go. 
Some examples are presented in Appendix B, 
along with a couple of similar errors from other 
children to indicate the probable generality of 
the phenomenon.6 
All these verbs specify an action which 
causes an entity to undergo a change of lo- 
cation. They differ from each other, however, 
in multiple nuances of meaning. For example, 
bring and take contrast with each other in 
many contexts in that they specify different 
directions of movement with respect to the 
speaker and hearer. The oddity of sentences 9, 
10, 20, and 21 in Appendix B, in which bring 
and take are interchanged (e.g., "She brought 
it over there"), stems from violations of direc- 
tionality. Put contrasts with bring and take in 
that it can rarely be used in the context of 
changes of location involving considerable dis- 
tances, and it implies nothing about direction 
of motion. Violations of these constraints ac- 
count for the strangeness of sentence 4, "Yeah, 
and I didn't put it home," said with reference 
to a book the child had forgotten to bring home 
with her. Put also contrasts with bring and take 
in that the latter two words imply bodily ac- 
companiment in many contexts, while the for- 
mer does not. Sentence 13, "I take it up," said 
as the child put a bowl into a cupboard, is thus 
odd because the use of take would be appro- 
priate only if the child herself were going up 
with the cup; sentences 12, 16, and 22 are 
anomalous for a similar reason. Put differs from 
certain other cause-change-of-location verbs 
like drop and make go in that it usually im- 
plies a deliberate act in which the agent ini- 
tiates contact with the object moved and main- 
tains this contact until the move is completed. 
6 Interchanges of bring and take have been shown to be widespread in children's spon- taneous speech (Richards 1976) and so are not documented further here. 
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Sentences 5 and 6 constitute errors because 
one or both of these conditions is not met. 
Christy and Eva used put, bring, take, and 
other related words like drop accurately for a 
period of time before they began to make errors 
in selecting among them. However, these errors 
began to occur considerably before those in- 
volving the interchange of put with make and 
give, in some cases (especially for bring) after 
a relatively short period of correct usage. The 
errors were also much more frequent than those 
involving put-make and put-give. The earliness 
and frequency of the errors, relative to those 
discussed in the preceding section, suggest 
that the children did not yet quite understand 
the meanings of the words involved. Further 
evidence for this possibility comes from Rich- 
ards's (1976) study of 4-7-year olds' sponta- 
neous use of take and bring in contrived play 
situations, which showed a complex and chang- 
ing pattern of mutual substitutions that did not 
subside until age 7 or beyond. But how can we 
reconcile the hypothesis that Christy and Eva 
had not quite worked out the meanings of 
these verbs with the fact they used them entire- 
ly correctly before they began to make errors? 
It may be that correct usage can coexist 
with incomplete semantic knowledge when 
children do not attempt too much with their 
words (see Carey [1978] for relevant discus- 
sion). Christy's and Eva's first uses of put, take, 
etc., were restricted to relatively specific, and 
different, contexts. For example, they initially 
used put in the context of donning clothing, 
placing small objects onto surfaces or into 
containers ("put on," "put in"), returning 
things to an original location ("put back"), or 
storing things out of sight ("put away"). In 
contrast, they used take for the removal of 
clothing from the body or small objects from 
surfaces or containers ("take off," "take out"), 
for requests to be taken outside ("take out- 
side"), and for asking that something be re- 
moved or protesting its removal ("take away"). 
A child who is quite capable of choosing 
the correct word in contexts like these (no 
real "choice" may in fact be necessary, since 
the words may not compete) may be at a loss 
when she wants to refer to a new act that does 
not fit clearly into any of these categories, such 
as sticking her thumbs up (example 15 in 
Appendix B). Perhaps it is at this point-when 
the child increasingly wants to encode novel 
actions that cause an entity to change location 
-that semantic similarities among words like 
put, bring, and take begin to be appreciated 
and the words start to compete for selection 
in particular speech contexts. At this point the 
child must begin to attend to semantic nuances 
of which she may earlier have been unaware, 
such as whether a word implies deliberateness, 
bodily accompaniment, or a certain direction- 
ality. Only after she has sorted out these de- 
tails will she be able to make future choices 
in a semantically principled way. 
Planning and Monitoring Speech in 
Childhood and Adulthood 
This paper has stressed the similarities 
between the children's substitution errors and 
those of adults. However, there are two im- 
portant differences as well, and they appear 
to be interrelated. 
The first difference is one of frequency. 
Particular substitution errors by adults-for ex- 
ample, contemporary for adjacent-apparently 
do not occur repeatedly within a relatively short 
time span. In contrast, many of the children's 
errors were recurrent, even though infrequent 
relative to the number 
of. 
correct uses. 
The second difference is in the speaker's 
propensity to correct errors. Adults often catch 
and repair their errors in midsentence, although 
they are not always conscious of having done 
so (Laver 1973). Christy and Eva, in contrast, 
seemed insensitive to having made errors. Ex- 
plicit self-corrections of word choice almost 
never occurred (example 41 in Appendix A is 
unusual in this respect). Very occasionally, the 
children spontaneously followed up a sentence 
containing an error with a sentence that was 
identical except that the wrong word had been 
replaced by the word that was called for by 
context and/or syntax (e.g., examples 10 and 
18 in Appendix A). Paraphrased "corrections" 
of this sort occurred most often in response to 
an adult's request for clarification (e.g., 20 in 
Appendix A). The direction of this paraphras- 
ing was always the same: a correct word always 
replaced an incorrect word, never the other 
way around. 
Whether or not a speaker makes errors 
in word choice depends upon how successfully 
he is able to compare competing lexical items, 
choose among them, and edit the choice prior 
to executing an overt motor program for the 
sentence. And whether or not correction takes 
place following an error depends on the speak- 
er's ability to monitor his output and detect 
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deviations from his intention (motivational fac- 
tors undoubtedly also play a role). Laver ob- 
serves that there is "considerable overlap of 
purpose" between planning a sentence prior to 
its execution and monitoring it afterward. Both 
processes involve "continual scrutiny, and, 
where necessary, revision, to ... achieve fairly 
continuously successful linguistic communica- 
tion" (1973, p. 141). Revisions carried out be- 
fore the execution of the motor program result 
in error-free speech, while revisions carried out 
after the execution of the program result in 
self-corrections. 
It is possible that the process of semantic 
integration, whereby words not previously seen 
as related move closer together semantically, 
puts a new strain on the child's planning and 
monitoring capacities. Prior to integration in 
a particular lexical domain, the child's desire 
to express a given idea may call up only one 
lexical item; no decisions are required. Follow- 
ing integration, semantically similar lexical 
items compete and a choice must be made. 
Lacking experience or skill at making the nec- 
essary selection, the child may for a time tend 
to settle on a candidate word too uncritically. 
In this case, an interlocutor's request for clarifi- 
cation may lead the child to reevaluate her se- 
lection for possible inadequacy and make an 
amendment where necessary. Alternatively, the 
errors may occur because candidate words are 
at first processed too slowly, such that the 
motor program is carried out before a final 
choice has been made. In this case the final 
choice may sometimes be overtly displayed 
even in the absence of external prodding, in 
the form of a corrected self-repetition. 
Two Final Problems 
In this paper I have presented examples 
of young children's word-choice errors that did 
not begin to occur until both the wrongly used 
word and the word it replaced had been used 
correctly for some time, and I have argued 
that existing hypotheses about why children use 
words incorrectly cannot account for these late- 
emerging errors. I then proposed that these 
errors stem from the child's implicit recognition 
of similarities among the meanings of the words 
involved. According to this account, the errors 
do not occur as soon as the words in question 
enter the child's speech because the child does 
not yet see them as related. Following some 
sort of developmental change, however, the 
words come to compete for selection when the 
child plans to express a certain idea. 
In conclusion, two unresolved problems 
should be mentioned. First is the issue, alluded 
to earlier, of the exact nature of this change. 
Several possibilities can be envisioned. One, 
for example, is that lexical items that the child 
eventually will occasionally interchange ini- 
tially share no semantic features. The errors 
start to occur when one or more common fea- 
tures are added to the lexical entries for the 
words. This account of progress (raised as a 
theoretical possibility by, 
McNeill [1970, p. 
116], who termed it "horizontal" semantic de- 
velopment) does not provide a cogent account 
of the present data. This is because the child's 
earlier correct usage requires us to assume that 
the child in some sense recognized that notions 
of causation, change of location, etc., are en- 
coded by the words put, give, and so on-but 
these are precisely the features that the words 
share and that seem to account for the eventual 
competition among them. 
A second possibility is that the onset of 
errors does not stem from the child's having 
added something qualitatively new to her lexi- 
cal entries but, rather, from her having im- 
plicitly compared the contents of her existing 
entries and recognized that some of the mean- 
ing components are the same (McNeill's [1970] 
"vertical" semantic development). This account 
is appealing but requires some further work 
to be made compelling. In particular, some 
explanation must be found for why identical 
components are not at first recognized as such. 
One line of thinking about this is suggested 
by Bowerman (1974) and Carey (1978). In 
these studies it is proposed that, although chil- 
dren initially may have a general conceptual 
understanding of the kinds of contexts in which 
particular words are appropriate, they have 
not yet isolated those aspects of the contexts 
that are of particular linguistic significance- 
that serve as semantic features or "lexical orga- 
nizers" (Carey's term) across a number of 
words in the same lexical domain. According to this account, an important facet of early 
semantic development is the child's gradual 
abstraction of those elements of the meanings 
of individual words-for example, "cause" and 
"change of location"-that serve to structure 
lexical domains taken as a whole. 
A second issue in need of exploration is 
whether semantic integration proceeds differ- 
ently for words of different types. This possi- 
984 Child Development 
bility is raised by the fact that almost all the 
substitution errors made by the children studied 
here-and all the recurrent ones-involved 
verbs and other relational words such as prepo- 
sitions and adjectives rather than nouns label- 
ing concrete objects. This asymmetry in the 
distribution of errors may be a function of the 
order in which semantic integration occurs for 
different words: children may come to appre- 
ciate semantic similarities among relational 
words earlier than among words of other kinds. 
Gentner's (this issue) arguments about the dif- 
ferences between relational words and concrete 
nouns suggest a possible reason for such a pro- 
gression. According to Gentner, the components 
of verbs and other relational words are "both 
less redundant and less densely interrelated 
than those of simple nouns." If true, this sug- 
gests that it should be easier for a child to 
tease apart the important meaning elements of 
relational words and recognize them as having 
recurrent organizational significance than to 
perform these analyses for concrete nouns. 
Alternatively, however, there may be no 
systematic difference in the time at which the 
semantic analysis and interrelating of words of 
different kinds get under way. In this case, dif- 
ferences in the extent to which children make 
substitution errors with relational words versus 
with concrete nouns might stem either from 
differences in the extent to which semantically 
related words of these types are "activated" 
by the intention to express given ideas or from 
differences in the relative efficiency with which 
children compare and select among competing 
words of different kinds. Evaluating these al- 
ternative explanations will require further re- 
search. 
Appendix A 
Correct and Incorrect Uses of Put, Give, Make, and Let7 
Examples of Initial Correct Usage for All Four Words 
A. Put 
1. C (about 2-0): Marc mommy put Christy pant away?/Christy put away nipple/I put money light/ I put it somewhere/Mommy got up couch, put glasses on/I put this mine bed with 
me/Put she right there. 2. E (1-11 to 2-0): Christy won't put on her hat/Christy put that thing in she's mouth/Lemme put it [sweater] on. 
B. Give 
3. C (2-0 to 2-3): Gimme more gum/Mommy gimme dolly/Grandma gimme Christy dolly/Daddy 
gimme Mommy milk (gimme as monomorphemic unit)/I give wow-wow some- 
thing eat/Mommy give my [= ime] a big bite/Daddy give my [= me] a kiss/Give 
Daddy black one. 4. E (1-11 to 2-0): Daddy gave my lady bug to me/Santa Claus give candy to me/Linda gave my [= me] choo choo train/I give my chocolate pudding daddy. C. Make 
5. C (2-0 to 2-3): I make back wet/I make it full/Make cow fix/It could make me sneeze/NP makes 
me cough/And I made Marc cry. 6. E (1-11 to 2-0): Make feel better my thumb/Make all clean/Make it standing up/I can't make 
standing up/Make fall down/Christy make my bonk feel better. D. Let 
7. C (2-1): Let Christy rock me by self/Let me bring her/Let me put my jacket on myself/ Let me Mommy get in here (= let Mommy; Let me as a unit). 
Examples of Incorrect Usage 
A. Put substituted for give 8. C (3-3): You put me just bread and butter. (Request for M to give it to her.) 9. C (3-4): You put the pink one to me. (Request for M to give her the pink one of two cups.) 10. C (3-4): Put Eva the yukky one first. Give Eva the yukky one first. (Wants M to give E the bad-tasting medicine before the good-tasting medicine.) 11. C (4-3): And we putted the orange juice to Tabby and Benji and me and Eva. (Reporting to M on distribution of orange juice.) 12. E (2-2): I go put it to Christy. (Starting off with a rubber band, then gives it to C.) 13. E (2-4): Can I go put it to her? (Then takes juice and gives it to C.) 
7 Here and in Appendix B, C = Christy, E = Eva, M = Mother, and D = Daddy. 
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14. E (2-4): M: It's all gone. (Re: C's juice.) 
E: Then put her some more. 
15. E (2-4): How come you're putting me that kind of juice? (As M prepares to give unfamiliar 
juice to E.) 
16. E (2-4): We're putting our things to you. (To D, after M has told children that it's time to 
give him their Father's Day presents.) 
B. Give substituted for put 
17. C (4-1): Whenever Eva doesn't need her towel she gives it on my table and when I'm done 
with it I give it back to her. 
18. E (2-7): Give some ice in here, Mommy. Put some ice in here, Mommy. (Pointing to ice 
crusher. ) 
19. E (2-9): Give those crayons right here. (Indicating to M spot on table near where she is 
sitting. ) 
20. E (2-10): I'm gonna give your glasses right here. (M: Huh?) 
I'm gonna put your glasses right here. 
21. E (2-10): Don't give those next to me. (As C dumps things on couch near E's seat.) 
C. Put substituted for make 
22. C (3-1): You put a place for Eva to put in. (Wants M to make a depression in a pillow in 
doll carriage, so E can ride.) 
23. C (3-9): But never ever put the door locked. (Scolding M.) 
24. C (4-3): I putted part of the sleeve blue so I crossed it out with red. (Telling M about mis- 
take in drawing.) 
25. C (5-4): I put it brown. (After colors skunk's stripe brown.) 
26. E (2-10): I want to put it tight. (Wants M to let her tighten nipple on her bottle.) 
27. E (3-0): (E has instructed M to draw a girl): 
M: You mean put her on this same page? 
E: Yeah, and put her just a little bit big. 
28. E (3-10): They put Dorothy different than in the book. (After watching a show on "The 
Wizard of Oz" on TV.) 
29. E (4-7): I'm not going to put it too long. (E cutting pieces of yarn for a doll's hair.) 
30. Rachel (4-11): I already put a list of who I want to come. (Telling grandmother on phone that 
she's made a list of guests for her birthday party.) 
D. Make substituted for put 
31. E (2-2): I make some butter my sandwich. (As E puts butter on bread.) 
32. E (3-0): Make them back up. (Wants M to put/set tiny dolls back onto coffee table; they'd 
just fallen off.) 
33. E (3-0): Don't take these apart 'cause I'm gonna make these . . on this. (Warning M not 
to remove parts of mechanical airplane; she then puts more pieces onto it.) 
34. Mindy (6-1): I wanta make my shoes in order. (Lining up shoes in closet.) 
E. Let substituted for makes 
35. C (3-3): I don't want Sandra to say good night. So don't let me. (Doesn't want visitor to 
come into her room at bedtime. Protesting to M.) 
36. C (3-6): I don't want to go to bed yet. Don't let me go to bed. (After M has told her she 
must go to bed.) 
37. C (3-8): How come you always let me wear those? (As M puts C's shoes on; she wants to 
wear another pair.) 
38. C (3-8): If you want to see it Ill let you. If you don't want to see it I won't let you. (Re: 
TV show.) 
39. C (3-11): Don't ever ever let me stay in my bedroom until I go to bed. (As M starts getting 
C ready for bed without officially ending C's stay in her room for naughtiness.) 
40. C (4-1): I wish you didn't let me go in my room 'cause it hurts my throat to cry. (After C 
gets sent to her room for naughtiness.) 
F. Make substituted for let 
41. C (3-6): But usually puppets make-let people put their hands in. (After M had called dolls 
with toilet paper roll bodies puppets; C disagreeing.) 
42. C (3-9): Make me watch it. (Wants D to let her watch a TV show. She used let appro- 
priately in this context shortly before.) 
8 These examples of substitutions involving make and let are all from Christy. She made 
this particular type of error much more frequently than Eva, although Eva's were patterned 
in the same way. 
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Appendix B 
Substitution Errors Involving Put, Take, and Bring 
A. Put substituted for take, bring, drop, make go 
1. C (2-2): I haffa put these off so me can do it better. (Trying to take rings off her fingers.) 
2. C (3-1): I wanta put it off. (Taking coat off.) 
3. E (2-1): I'll go put rubber band off. (Starting to take rubber band off deck of cards.) 4. E (2-3): M: Did you leave a book over there? 
E: Yeah, and I didn't put it home. (About a book she didn't bring home from sit- 
ter's house.) 
5. E (2-1): I put those way down there. (After drops two Kleenexes on the floor from her 
high chair.) 
6. C (3-8): You put me forward a little bit. (To M, after M jerks car while driving, making C 
go forward.) 
7. Jaime (4-11): Put my hand out. (Take. After gets hand caught in mouth of piggy bank.) 8. Mindy (6-0): You said what I was going to say . . put the words right out of my mouth. (Took.) 
B. Take substituted for bring, put 
9. C (2-2): Hey, I take this at home. (Finding doll she had brought home earlier.) 10. C (3-7): Take it to me. (Wants E to bring a toy to her from across the room.) 11. C (2-1): Daddy take his pants on. (Put.) 
12. C (2-3): I haffa take this in. (Putting doll's dress into pocket of doll's apron.) 13. E (2-0): I take it up. (Putting bowl up onto shelf in cupboard.) 14. E (2-3): I'm gonna take your nose on. (Pretending to put M's nose back on.) 15. E (4-2): After I do that I take them up again like that. (Showing M how she puts her 
thumbs up after concealing them under her hands in her lap.) 16. E (4-6): I took it down the slot. (After E puts a scrap of paper into car ashtray.) 17. E (4-6): She's taking it on! (Upset when a friend is putting E's floatie [a lifesaving device] 
on her arm.) 
18. E (4-9): You better quit it! Don't take your feet over on my side! (E and C in bathtub to- 
gether; C has put her feet into E's territory.) 
C. Bring substituted for take, put 
19. C (2-1): Let bring this out. (Wants to take cooked bacon out of pan on stove.) 20. C (3-4): She brought it over there. (Watching dog take food into adjacent room.) 21. E (2-9): I'm gonna bring this outside. (Planning to take a toy outside. To M, who is inside 
with her.) 
22. E (2-9): I'm bringing it back to my pocket. (Putting a piece of gum back in her pocket.) 
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